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ABSTRACT 
 
While scholars have explained how business has increasingly taken on regulatory roles to ad-
dress social and environmental challenges, less attention has been given to the process of how 
business is made responsible for wicked problems. Drawing on a study of ‘conflict minerals’ 
in the Democratic Republic of Congo, we examine the process through which companies be-
came responsible for a humanitarian crisis. We contribute by 1) bridging insights from con-
tentious performance and deliberative approaches – to present a model of corporate political 
responsibilization for a wicked problem that explains how a ‘field frame’ of responsibility 
can emerge 2) explaining shifting boundaries between public and private responsibilities and 
the changing role of the state as catalytic rather than coercive 3) showing how responsibility 
can be attributed to a target by framing an issue and its root cause in ways that allow such an 
attribution, and how the attribution can diffuse and solidify. 
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Who is responsible for human rights violations, such as in the 2013 collapse of the Rana Pla-
za textile factory in Bangladesh, where over 1,100 workers died? Is it local factory operators 
flouting national laws, local governments failing to enforce these laws, multinational retailers 
squeezing suppliers, Western consumers wanting cheap goods, or the international communi-
ty failing to intervene? The question of responsibility attribution has been posed for many 
complex social issues, such as extreme poverty, pandemics and climate change, described as 
‘wicked problems’ (Conklin, 2006; Rittel and Webber, 1973). Wicked problems are large 
scale social challenges caught in causal webs of interlinking variables spanning national 
boundaries that complicate both their diagnosis and prognosis. The sheer magnitude and 
transnational scope of wicked problems in a globalizing world has spurred calls for a multi-
pronged governance approach, with particular attention to companies and other private actors 
(Scherer and Palazzo, 2011). 
While interpretations about what is public or private responsibility have shifted over time 
(Davis, Whitman and Zald, 2008), more recently, what Shamir (2008) calls an ‘age of re-
sponsibilization’, new CSR approaches have sought change in the traditional role of business 
as ‘profit-only’ actor. In the political version of CSR literature, businesses are seen to assume 
governance duties to solve major societal ills amid the regulatory voids left by the retreating 
state (Scherer and Palazzo, 2011). Yet, corporations also exploit regulatory voids (e.g., 
Banerjee, 2008) as evidenced by the persistence of modern day slavery (Crane, 2013) and 
large-scale corporate tax avoidance.  
More attention is thus warranted to understanding how and why some regulatory voids be-
come spaces for corporate intervention, while others are ignored or even exploited by compa-
nies. While political CSR scholarship has enlightened us about how regulatory voids have led 
to a political role for business, we know less about the process of how business is made re-
sponsible for societal problems. We argue that responsibility – the state of duty, accountabil-
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ity and opportunity for action for an issue (Newell, 2005) – is socially constructed through 
collective negotiation. It would be productive to learn more about how interpretive shifts oc-
cur that prompt companies to rethink their socio-moral obligations for an issue of concern, 
how new modes of corporate engagement emerge, and how the boundaries between public 
and private responsibility get redefined.  
Social movement scholars have demonstrated the influence of ‘contentious performance’ 
(Tilly, 2008) – civil society campaigns attacking companies for social and environmental ills  
– in inducing corporate behavioural change (e.g., Davis et al., 2008; den Hond and de Bak-
ker, 2007; King and Pearce, 2010). However, scant attention is given to the social process of 
constructing responsibility and moral engagement through which companies may come to ac-
cept responsibility, rather than engage only in compliance or manipulation to avoid sanctions 
and appear legitimate (Scherer, Palazzo and Seidl, 2013). To understand this process, we 
draw on the foundational work on framing (Goffman, 1974), which explains how perceptions 
of social reality can be shaped. Snow and Benford (1988, p. 199) identified three core fram-
ing tasks to generate collective action for an issue; diagnosis, prognosis, and motivation. 
However, wicked problems complicate these framing tasks (Lewicki, Gray, and Elliott, 
2003). It may be unclear 1) what the root cause is and who the central villain is given that 
wicked problems are caught in complex causal webs 2) what the solutions might be given the 
problem’s ambiguity; and 3) how wider support is mobilized for implicating a new target in 
the problem given that prima facie its link with the problem is unclear. Given these challeng-
es, it is worth examining how companies come to be responsibilized for a wicked problem. 
To address these questions, we conduct a qualitative study of how companies assumed re-
sponsibility for a wicked problem in the Democratic Republic of Congo, described by UN 
Secretary General Ban Ki-moon in 2009 as ‘a humanitarian crisis of catastrophic dimen-
sions’. Whereas companies initially resisted responsibilization, we identified three major 
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‘frame shifts’ that led them to shift from denial to acquiescence, and, finally to assume a po-
litical role in conflict resolution. We identified mechanisms underlying these frame shifts, 
and explain how NGOs and the state created joint capacities for responsibilizing companies 
for what was previously seen to be a public problem. By focalizing the emotionally ‘hot’ is-
sue of rape and linking it with the use of ‘conflict minerals’ in mobile phones NGOs con-
structed a causal link that brought the deadly violence in a far flung part of Congo close to 
consumers’ lives. NGOs alongside sympathetic US policy makers enabled the inclusion of 
‘conflict minerals’ reporting in the 2010 Dodd-Frank Acti in a hybrid governance arrange-
ment that implicated companies in the humanitarian crisis.  
THEORETICAL MOTIVATIONS 
While notions about what are public versus private responsibilities are socially negotiated 
and historically contingent (Davis et al., 2008), growing business influence in a globalized 
world has inspired calls for companies to ameliorate social ills. But as companies take on po-
litical roles, the boundaries between public and private domains of responsibility have be-
come increasingly blurred.  
Political CSR, Social Movements and Framing  
While companies have been accused of exploiting governance gaps to increase their hege-
monic influence (Banerjee, 2008), political CSR scholars argue that companies are plugging 
governance gaps and taking on responsibility for delivering public goods (Matten and Crane, 
2005; Scherer and Palazzo, 2007; 2011). One strand of political CSR explains how firms co-
create new regimes of private governance (Scherer and Palazzo, 2011), such as social and en-
vironmental standards (Bartley, 2007) through deliberative engagement in contexts of incom-
plete regulation (Scherer and Palazzo, 2007). A second strand – ‘contentious performance’ 
(Tilly, 2008) – draws on the social movements literature to explain how firms are pressured 
by activists, consumers and others into assuming responsibility for social ills (den Hond and 
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de Bakker, 2007; King and Pearce, 2010). While the traditional focus was on how social 
movements target the state to ameliorate social ills (e.g., Snow, 2004), recent work explains 
how they pressure companies into acting more responsibly (e.g., Davis et al., 2008; Weber, 
Rao and Thomas, 2009).  
Whoever the target, making an actor responsible for an issue involves framing –  the ‘sig-
nification work’ to focus attention on an issue, convey one set of meanings over another, and 
reconstitute the way in which some objects of attention or actors are seen or linked (Snow, 
2013). The notion of framing is central to social movements. Snow and Benford (1988) iden-
tified three core framing tasks; diagnosis, prognosis, and motivation. Through diagnostic 
framing, the problematic situation is defined as in need of a remedy and the actors or causes 
held responsible for the problem are identified. Diagnosis answers the question; ‘what is the 
problem?’ and ‘who or what is to blame’? Prognostic framing stipulates possible solutions or 
goals, and the strategies to achieve those goals, i.e., ‘what should be done’? Motivational 
framing is the call to arms to mobilize potential adherents (Snow and Benford, 1988). By 
pursuing these framing tasks, movement actors attend to mobilizing collective action 
(Klandermans, 1988) to problematize and challenge ‘existing authoritative views and fram-
ings of reality’ (Snow, 2004, p. 385).  
 While many studies have tended to focus on the strategic deployment of extant ‘master 
frames’ to mobilize support, in Goffman’s (1974) view, framing is seen as an interpretive 
process of meaning construction (Benford, 1997; Cornelissen and Werner, 2014). Framing 
then is the ‘signification work’ to focus attention on an issue, convey one set of meanings 
over another, and reconstitute the way in which some objects of attention or actors are seen or 
linked (Snow, 2013). To frame is to ‘select some aspects of a perceived reality and make 
them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem 
definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the 
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item described’ (Entman, 1993, p. 52). If actors with divergent frames converge around a 
shared interpretation, framing can have a ‘transformative function’ (Snow, 2013) in precipi-
tating shifts in collective understandings – ‘frame shifts’ (Ansari, Wijen and Gray, 2013). 
Over time, these collective understandings can gain currency to emerge as robust ‘field 
frames’ – broader structures of cultural meaning (Lounsbury, Ventresca and Hirsch, 2003).  
While interpretive processes of meaning construction are at the heart of framing, wicked 
problems complicate ‘signification work’ and pose at least three major challenges for core 
framing tasks. 
Framing challenges in making companies complicit in a wicked problem 
First, wicked problems are complex social problems for which there may be no ‘directly-
traceable causes’ (Gioia, 1992, p. 381). For instance, poverty has been linked to both a lack 
of income and a deficit in human capabilities (Sen, 1999). This makes it difficult to delimit 
wicked problems, identify villains, and offer definitive solutions (e.g., Waddock, 2008). Un-
like cases, where an offending party and societal harm can be readily linked, such as Union 
Carbide and the Bhopal disaster in India, many social ills involve ‘structural social injustice’, 
where no readily identifiable villain ‘automatically comes to the fore’ for assigning blame 
(Bartley and Child, 2014, p. 3). The common ‘liability CSR model’ for establishing guilt or 
blame for a societal harm may thus fall short as a guide for assigning responsibility 
(Schrempf, 2014; Young, 2006).  
Second, since stakeholders may differ on the causes of the problem, they are also likely to 
clash with regards to what constitutes an acceptable solution. Wicked problems cannot be 
conclusively “solved” as there are no formulas or objective criteria to judge a solution as 
right or wrong. Solutions are assessed in a social context in which ‘many parties are equally 
equipped, interested, and/or entitled to judge [them]’ (Rittel and Webber, 1973, p. 163). An 
issue like climate change cannot be defined as either an economic, political, social or natural 
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problem and the field is fraught with disputes about whether it needs market, regulatory, or 
technological solutions (Ansari et al., 2013). Yet, ambiguity may also make the problem 
seem like a ‘lost cause’ (Klandermans, 1988) which may inhibit collective action (Gamson 
and Meyer, 1996). The challenge then is to define a problem and establish causality in ways 
that allow targeting a potential villain and offer the hope of a viable solution.  
Third, divergent views about a problem’s definition, root cause and remedy complicates 
mobilizing wider support for targeting one particular actor, such as business. Moreover, com-
panies tend to be strategic, unitary actors that can often respond quickly and coherently to 
stakeholder activism, leveraging a sophisticated arsenal of tools to deflect, evade or resist 
pressures to make them complicit in a problem (Bundy, Shropshire and Buchholtz, 2013; 
McDonnell and King, 2013). The challenge then is to find effective ways for mobilizing sup-
port in implicating companies and combating counter-mobilization.  
These framing challenges make it a formidable task to make companies responsible for 
wicked problems and motivate our two research questions: How are companies responsibil-
ized for a wicked problem they may not identify with? What is the role of private and public 
actors in this process?  
METHODS 
To study responsibilization, we draw on the case of conflict minerals in the Democratic Re-
public of Congo (DRC). Within a few years, companies across industries – regardless of 
whether they source minerals from the DRC – became implicated in addressing the country’s 
human rights abuses. We selected this case because the focal issue – conflict and violence – 
is a wicked problem for which business assumed responsibility alongside the public sector. 
Research Context 
A catastrophic humanitarian crisis. Despite its immense natural wealth, including the largest 
reserves of tungsten ore, the DRC was last of the 187 countries listed on the UNDP Human 
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Development Index in 2012. It is arguably a failed state battling indiscriminate killings, mass 
rapes, child soldiers, malnourishment and forced labour for resource extraction. After decades 
of exploitation under colonial and dictatorial regimes, armed conflict and sexual violence 
have continued to ravage Africa’s second-largest country. The ethnic conflict fuelling the 
1994 Rwanda genocide spilled over to its Eastern part and contributed to Africa’s World War 
(Trefon, 2011). More than 5.4 million people reportedly died from violence, famine and dis-
ease. The war ended in 2006, but conflict continues. Described as the ‘rape capital of the 
world’ (Autesserre, 2012), almost 40% of women in the Eastern DRC have suffered sexual 
violence, contributing to the spread of HIV. The government has failed to manage the crisis, 
making it a classic case of a ‘governance gap’. The DRC has been described ‘a vast laborato-
ry where a host of international partners are engaged in experimenting with different state-
building alchemies.’ However, international donors, UN agencies and NGOs have been seen 
as largely ineffective in supporting Congolese state-building (Trefon, 2011, p. 703).   
New governance approach focusing on conflict minerals. Since mid-2000, attention has 
shifted to the illegal exploitation of natural resources. The UN Security Council passed reso-
lutions to control illegal mining in 2003 and 2005. When this failed, a new frame emerged on 
preventing the entry of ‘conflict minerals’ into the global supply chain, thus implicating com-
panies. This frame is reflected in the conflict minerals amendment to the 2010 Dodd-Frank 
Act (US). Section 1502 declared gold and the ‘3Ts’ (tin, tantalum and tungsten) to be conflict 
minerals, whose trade could finance armed groups in DRC and adjoining countries. The rul-
ing does not ban the import of minerals, but mandates US listed companies to annually dis-
close whether they sourced minerals from conflict zones. 
Conflict minerals disclosures allowed NGOs and other stakeholders to monitor corporate 
behaviour, generating ripples in the business and policy world. Since 2009, numerous public-
private partnerships and industry-led initiatives have sought greater transparency in compa-
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nies’ sourcing practices. A private support infrastructure involving the ‘big four’ accountancy 
firms is assisting companies in conducting human rights ‘due diligence’ in their supply 
chains. The impact is contested. The Enough Project (2014) reported that by 2014, over 40 
percent of the world’s 3T and gold smelters have passed third-party conflict-free audits, 112 
out of 155 Congolese mines surveyed were declared conflict-free, and 21 global electronics 
companies, including industry giants Apple and Intel, sourced from conflict-free mines. Oth-
ers have pointed to job losses among the artisanal mining communities (Open Letter, 2014). 
In any case, while many have described the Congolese conflict as ‘a forgotten war’, NGO ac-
tivism and the US conflict minerals legislation and similar measures afoot in Canada and EU, 
have put this humanitarian crisis back on the global political – and business – agenda.   
Data Collection 
We collected publically available documents from 2005 to 2014 related to conflict minerals, 
including reports, press releases and blogs by human rights NGOs, companies, industry asso-
ciations, UN documents including Security Council resolutions, official US congressional 
records and drafts of the evolving legal text. We also collected documents on the implemen-
tation of Section 1502 by the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) that engaged in 
a two year consultation with investors, companies, and NGOs to set disclosure requirements. 
The process lasted from July 2010 (Dodd Frank Act) to August 2012 (SEC Final Rule). We 
collected all 525 public comment letters submitted to the SEC, (88 in Phase 1, 07-12/2010; 
437 in Phase 2, 12/2010-08/2012) meeting documentations (155 meetings) and the public 
roundtable transcript in October 2011 (>45,000 words). We conducted 29 semi-structured in-
terviews lasting between 30-180 minutes with respondents from the US government (Gov), 
NGOs (NGO), gold and electronics industries (I) on conflict minerals. 
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Data Analysis  
Our analytical approach is open ended and inductive (Corbin and Strauss, 2008). First, we 
created an integrated database and used the qualitative analysis software, Dedoose to develop 
and refine emerging codes. We developed an event history database (Van de Ven and Poole, 
2002). Table 1 provides a timeline of key events.  
--------------------- Insert Table 1 ------------------------- 
Second, we examined what, when and who contributed to responsibilizing business. We ana-
lysed documents, interviews and SEC comment letters to identify and categorize stakeholder 
clusters according to the types of engagement. We sought evidence on if, how, and why ac-
tors changed their interpretation of the wicked problem, which we label ‘frame shift’ (Ansari 
et al., 2013). We identified five ‘frame shifts’ (1a, 1b, 1c, 2 and 3) (see Table 2).  We used 
‘temporal bracketing’ (Langley 1999) to impose rough temporal phases on data based on key 
events. Third, we began to consider data and theory in parallel and collapsed first-order codes 
into constitutive themes. We sought mechanisms underlying frame shifts. Social mechanisms 
(Weber, 2006), similar to ‘process drivers’ (Langley, 1999, p. 904), describe explanatory pat-
terns or propensities at an analytical level above description and below universal law (Gross, 
2009). Our interest was in identifying transformational mechanisms – how interactions 
among actors are ‘transformed into some kind of collective outcome’ (Hedström and Swed-
berg, 1998, p. 23). We created a label for each mechanism. To illustrate, we identified ‘causal 
linkage’ by drawing on the concept of ‘causal story’ (e.g., Stone, 1989) to explain the crea-
tion of plausible causal links between problems and targets. See table 2 for our framework of 
frame shifts, mechanisms and illustrative data. 
-------------------------Insert Table 2---------------------------- 
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FINDINGS: PRIVATE SECTOR RESPONSIBILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 
A field-frame of corporate responsibility for wicked problems  
How have companies ‘who could barely locate the Congo on the map’ become ‘part of a con-
stituency for peace in Congo’ (NGO5) responsible for mitigating conflict? While the humani-
tarian crisis in DRC had long been regarded as government responsibility, in less than five 
years, corporate responsibility has turned towards ‘a corner of the world that for a long time 
nobody was paying attention to’ (I14). In what activists described as a ‘sea-change’, flagship 
electronic brands have pledged their support for the DRC. A senior executive from Apple, 
which declared its tantalum supply chain as conflict-free in 2014, declared the company’s in-
tention to ‘truly influence the demand situation and change things’ by ending sourcing from 
mines that were ‘unacceptable from a human rights standpoint’ (Apple, 2014). Our data sug-
gest an iterative process of creating a new business responsibility frame involving human 
rights NGOs and enterprising politicians.  
Taming the wicked problem through constructing a responsibility frame 
Diagnostic and prognostic breakdown: Conflict is intractable. Policy makers and others had 
viewed the Congolese conflict as ‘conceptually difficult to know where to start’ (Trefon, 
2011, p. 718). The sources of violence were manifold and contested. Think tanks, academics 
and activists posited several competing explanations for the root cause of violence. These in-
cluded local land disputes, corruption, failed public institutions, interference from neighbour-
ing Rwanda, ethnic polarities, culture of mistrust, and legacies of wars, pillage and colonial 
rule (Autesserre, 2012). A Campaigns Manager (NGO4) admitted the failure to diagnose the 
intractable conflict and noted the ‘many failed attempts to communicate this because of the 
very complex narrative’: 
With Congo we were struggling to find that narrative for people to understand what’s tak-
ing place, something that’s so far beyond comprehension, at least in the Western world.  
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In other conflict zones, such as Sudan, human rights NGOs could identify the ‘bad guy com-
mitting mass atrocities against innocent civilians...It was very simple for people to understand 
and therefore become active on’ (NGO4). But the convoluted nature of the Congolese situa-
tion did not afford a clear narrative that could mobilize international support. 
Frame shift 1a: Recasting the wicked problem from intractable to actionable. By 2008, a 
new framing of the Congolese crisis emerged that reconceptualised it from being intractable 
to being amenable to intervention. Rather than calling for action on a daunting mesh of inter-
related causes and problems, ‘conflict minerals’ focused attention on one strategic issue; pre-
venting trade in conflict minerals. As a call for action, this frame was perceived as ‘easier 
than saying corruption is the problem, or the justice system doesn’t exist. Those are never go-
ing to be reformed’ (NGO2). 
Reducing complexity: Conflict minerals as root cause. The frame shift was enabled by 
championing a single, tractable root cause of the conflict. Among possible explanations for 
the crisis in Eastern DRC, NGOs focused on trade in ‘conflict minerals’ as the root cause 
(NGO4). Revenues from minerals allegedly financed rebel groups, militias, and criminal net-
works in the Congolese army, who secured control over mines and trading routes. NGOs that 
had long campaigned to involve the international community in the crisis recognized that fo-
cusing on ‘the economic drivers of conflict’ was a crude simplification of the Congolese con-
flict. Privately, some admitted that conflict minerals ‘may not be a root cause’ and could even 
mask other causes of the conflict. However, conflict minerals served as a comprehensible 
frame for Western audiences. A field investigator justified the focus: 
While we cannot grasp everything we said ok, let’s focus on this and see how we could 
break the silence, raising awareness in the USA, especially in target universities, youth, 
and also international civil society organizations back in Washington. (NGO6) 
 
Narrowing the scope of conflict to trade in minerals allowed actors to reduce complexity and 
portray the Congolese crisis as being potentially resoluble.  
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Frame shift 1b: Making companies complicit in a wicked problem. Till late in 2008, calls 
for action were directed at governments and the international community ‘to create peace and 
stability’ through ‘supporting and training the Congolese army’, ‘rebuilding eastern Congo’s 
collapsing infrastructure’ and ‘institution-building’ (Enough, 2007). ‘It wasn’t viewed as a 
company problem’, as a respondent (I14) noted. But from 2008 onwards, NGOs started to ar-
gue that ‘the best place to start was not with the Congolese government but with US compa-
nies’ (NGO7). An industry lobbyist described the shift: 
Up until the end of 2008 it’s a government problem. [US] State Department isn’t doing 
enough, the UN isn’t doing enough, EU isn’t doing enough; all these groups need to do 
more. And suddenly…a new idea was taken up that this was a supply chain problem. (I14) 
 
She argued that ‘NGOs thought of dragging companies into this because, perhaps, they would 
be more responsive than governments have been’.  
 Devising a narrative to link conflict and companies. Implicating a new actor; downstream 
companies in the global minerals supply chain, was made possible by theorizing trade in 
minerals as fuelling armed conflict. While campaign groups ‘didn’t initially start out saying 
we want to do something about conflict minerals and corporate social responsibility’ (NGO9), 
they carved out a ‘causal story’ (Stone, 1989) that connected conflict to end-user sourcing of 
minerals. Notably, the NGO, Enough Project changed its strategy to put pressure on ‘actors 
who have leverage’ at the top of the minerals supply chain – brand name electronics compa-
nies. End-user companies that typically used minimal amounts of minerals (that may not have 
even been mined in DRC) were clearly not the most culpable actor. However, by focusing on 
chains of influence in the global supply chain, NGOs argued that ‘actors who have the high-
est potential for influence are those who have the buying power’ (NGO7). Focusing on min-
eral sourcing rendered the intractable conflict in DRC into a problem that could be addressed 
by companies through change in their sourcing policies. 
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 Frame shift 1c: Shifting the crisis from back-of-the mind to front-of-the-mind issue. To 
enlist broader support, human rights groups constructed an emotional connection between the 
Congolese crisis and target audiences to move the crisis from a ‘back-of-the mind’ issue to a 
‘front-of-the-mind’ issue (Giddens, 2009). While conflict minerals provided a plausible ex-
planation for the conflict, it was still remote to consumers and end-user companies: ‘It wasn’t 
on anyone’s radar’ a manager explained (I2). The challenge was to compellingly connect 
Western audiences with conflict in DRC.  
Invoking sexual violence as a trademark tactic and connecting it to mobile phones. To 
make the issue salient, NGOs stoked moral outrage by crafting a link between sexual vio-
lence – an emotionally laden issue – and consumer electronics. Respondents reported that 
this connection ‘proved to be that missing link that got people interested in the crisis in 
Congo’ (NGO6). While the humanitarian crisis had many facets, human rights activists 
tactically singled out sexual violence against vulnerable women to draw attention to this 
single category of victims. This was seen to arouse more emotional support than other vic-
tims, such as child soldiers, who could become the future perpetrators of violence. Sexual 
violence became ‘I guess, a trademark tactic’, a campaigner (NGO4) noted and was por-
trayed as ‘a hallmark trait of the conflict’ to ‘create outrage’ (NGO7) among Western au-
diences. It gained high profile attention when US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited 
Congo in 2009.  
 
In the same year the Enough Project launched a campaign; ‘Raise Hope for Congo’, that 
linked ‘Cell Phones, Conflict Minerals, and the Worst Sexual Violence in the World’. The 
aim was to create a ‘public demand for conflict-free cell phones […] so that the industry 
would respond to that market’. While conflict minerals were also used in aerospace, or jewel-
lery, Enough’s strategy targeted consumer electronics companies for their potential to ‘con-
nect with the public’ and ‘provoke a public response’:  
We saw it as an entry point to galvanize a movement. We knew that our support base of 
supporters were an American public who very readily connect with their electronics 
brands. (NGO4) 
 
The connection with mobile phones was seen as ‘a Godsend in terms of advocacy’ (NGO9) to 
bring sexual violence close to Western audiences, as a campaigner noted: 
In the US, or Europe or in places where people don’t really feel connected to the Congo, 
they’re now able to draw the connection. Because they’re like ‘oh, hey, my cell phone is 
connected’. (NGO3) 
16 
 
But respondents also admitted that the link was purposefully created:  
Neither conflict minerals nor sexual violence fully defines what’s happening in Congo but 
these things that can attract attention from far away. But I don’t have illusions that the av-
erage person on the street in the US is ever going to understand the complexity of it, so I’d 
rather have them feel, you know, connected in some way. (NGO6) 
 
A simplified narrative ‘stripped down’ the complexity of the conflict. The new causal story 
emphasized one main group of victims (sexual abused women), one key cause (armed groups 
illegally exploiting Congo’s mineral wealth), and one key solution (foreign companies re-
stricting the use of conflict minerals in their products). 
Company resistance to the responsibility frame. Companies initially refuted the idea that 
conflict was a private sector issue. They felt unduly ‘cast responsible’ for ‘a political conflict’ 
(I4). ‘At the end of the day corporations don’t start a conflict. Governments do’ (I8).  
To expect that companies can fix failed governance alone, simply by sending an economic 
signal, is fundamentally mistaken. Most of the challenges in the DRC are outside normal 
business responsibility. (I13) 
Companies used three strategies to resist responsibility. First, they claimed the complexity 
of global supply chains made it impossible to trace their mineral sources. The ‘most common 
response from companies’ was to mock the feasibility of tracing minerals: 
They almost laughed in our face at the thought that we would even ask. They said that, 
“you know, we have 4,000 first tier suppliers. Those suppliers have suppliers. Do you 
know how many companies you’re talking about?” (NGO4) 
 
Second, companies disputed the idea that trade in conflict minerals was the root cause. For 
many, this seemed ‘a bit of a made up problem’ (I14) to detract from a failed government: 
The bad news is it’s a bit of a red herring. They have everybody focused on the minerals 
trade which is not the root of the problem and even if addressed is not going to solve the 
problems. (I14) 
 
Third, companies claimed it was too costly and futile. Most companies saw themselves as ‘far 
removed from the source’ of conflict minerals and were reluctant to invest their resources in 
‘tracking lots of [minerals] that has no relationship at all to the Congo’ (I12). Given that most 
Congolese minerals were smuggled out of the country and exported to non-Western markets 
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(e.g., China), Western companies ‘felt that their influence was minimal’ (NGO5). They re-
jected the idea that companies could solve a problem where governments had failed. 
Solidifying the responsibility frame: A catalytic legislation 
Frame shift 2: Shift from denying responsibility to accepting responsibility. Although ini-
tially reluctant to accept responsibility for the Congolese crisis, we report major develop-
ments that led many companies to shift their initial position on the issue. 
A mutually empowering collaboration between NGOs and government. NGOs reported 
that ‘they thought it would be a small campaign that never saw the light of day’ (NGO2). But 
their campaigns to implicate companies paralleled the efforts of a small bipartisan coalition 
of US legislators mobilized by the media coverage NGOs had generated against the use of 
rape as a weapon of war. Modelled on the Kimberley Process to prevent the import of ‘blood 
diamonds’, in 2008 US legislators had initially proposed an import ban on conflict minerals 
aimed at ‘getting the money out of the conflict’. While this bill was resisted by industry and 
died in Congress, it spurred renewed NGO efforts. In a mutually empowering coalition, 
NGOs provided an emotionally-laden narrative that added moral urgency to legislative inter-
vention. While initially named as one of the issues, the 2009 bill singled out ‘widespread 
sexual violence and rape that continue at an alarming rate’ (Cong. Rec., 2010). The goal was 
to ‘save women’ by ‘breaking up a multibillion dollar black market’ (Gov1). Senator Durbin, 
co-initiator of the legislation recalled his first encounter with abused women: 
I wasn't prepared for what I found at Goma [city in Eastern Congo]. Imagine, one of the 
poorest places on earth…Look at the roadside and find women by the dozens sitting in the 
dust praying that they'll get a chance to get into that hospital for a surgery they need [due 
to gang rape injuries]. Looking into their desperate faces as they’re waiting for help and 
imagining what they have seen, what they have been through…is something you’re not 
likely to forget. It’s a war where, sadly, rape is a major weapon. (SEC, 2011) 
 
The industry strongly lobbied against the bills in Congress and Senate, ‘trying to find the 
weakest bill that they could defeat…just make it go away’ (Gov2). NGOs countered by using 
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moral shock for the ‘micro targeting of members of Congress, trying to get some pressure on 
them from constituents to...be supportive or allow it [the bill] to go through’ (NGO4).  
Despite these efforts, ‘it never moved anywhere’, as Congressman McDermott (sponsored 
of the bill) recalled. A drafter of the legislation remembered stiff industry opposition. 
This is hardball. I mean, this is serious money and this is about liabilities, this is about ac-
cess to resources. There’s competitive advantage for being able to buy minerals below 
what would otherwise be the world market price…it was rough. (Gov1) 
 
Notwithstanding ‘failures’ in getting these bills passed, by late 2009, a powerful network 
had emerged among bipartisan policy makers in the US Congress and NGO activists that was 
eager to hold companies accountable for their mineral sourcing.  
‘Sliding in’ a conflict minerals provision in the Dodd Frank Act. Skilled legislators leveraged 
an opportunity to create a ‘ground-breaking legislation’ (Gov1). This opportunity emerged 
during the finalizing of the Dodd-Frank Act in May 2010 – the US government’s response to 
the financial crisis. ‘Slipped in’ as an amendment to the main Act, Dodd-Frank conferees 
unanimously adopted the conflict minerals amendment Section 1502 (out of 1504 sections). 
Once it was signed into law in July 2010, NGOs reported how ‘all of a sudden the tide had 
turned’. Companies, initially reluctant to engage, now ‘saw the writing on the wall’. The con-
flict minerals provision ‘really kicked everything into high gear’ (NGO3). A respondent not-
ed: ‘I’m not exaggerating, it was like the day after Dodd Frank was passed people started 
calling us up’ (NGO9). After being ignored for years, he recalled being invited to Silicon Val-
ley to meet with the CEO of an electronics firm: ‘He was saying: ‘you guys are the f***ing 
geniuses…hey what do you guys want us to do so?’’ 
But in practice, industry respondents admitted that they were ‘looking at the path of least 
resistance and the easiest way they could comply with the regulation’ (I4). Companies might 
simply ‘say that 100% of all of these minerals is from a conflict zone’ (I2). A respondent from 
an industry association explained why ‘99% of that marketplace doesn’t care’: 
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A manufacturer like Boeing who has about 107,000 different suppliers for parts that go in-
to their aircraft don’t really care if the bonding wire is conflict free, full of conflict, or kind 
of conflict! And it’s not a branding thing at all for them. […] And if you don’t want to fly 
on Boeing aircrafts then good luck to you! (I2)  
Privately, many companies were ‘angry’ or ‘caught by surprise’ at being implicated in the 
issue of conflict minerals (I6). For instance, Kraft Foods/Mondelez (SEC, 2011) noted that 
they ‘were surprised that the disclosure requirements would apply to them’ because of the tin 
used in their packaging for biscuits. Nevertheless, companies reluctantly realized that ‘legis-
lation has come out of the pipeline, you have no choice but to be proactive’ (I3) and began to 
change their stance from resistance to acquiescence.  
 Naming & shaming companies and requiring them to ‘know & show’. When the legisla-
tion for mandatory disclosure was imminent, NGOs had already begun to link individual 
companies to conflict minerals, potentially tarnishing their reputation through ‘naming and 
shaming’ offenders. For example, The Enough Project’s company rankings – a traffic light 
system (green, yellow, red) – ranked the best and worst performing companies. The conflict 
minerals provision then required companies to ‘know and show’ the use of minerals from 
conflict zones. ‘It doesn’t even say you can’t use conflict minerals. It doesn’t ban conflict 
minerals. It just says ‘you have to tell us if you do’ (Gov1). This empowered NGOs and pri-
vate investors to monitor company behaviours. A staffer (Gov1) explained: Mandatory disclo-
sure provided a ‘big tool for NGOs, but you have to do the enforcement’ given the large vol-
ume of reports annually filed with the SEC. A respondent noted:  
It is about the ‘naming and shaming’ of the companies. You know the SEC doesn’t do 
that. So it is going to take some kind of watchdog organizations, hopefully not just us, that 
will comb through these reports, find where companies had to report on this section and 
you know, actually hold them accountable for that. (NGO5) 
 
NGOs therefore emphasized that ‘[t]he job is not finished’ (Enough, 2012) as they would be-
come part of law enforcement by taking up the role of ‘vigilantes’ or ‘behavioural police’ 
(Gov1). Conflict minerals reporting provided a monitoring tool and induced social judge-
ments about corporate behaviours. 
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Making conflict minerals disclosures ‘matter’. To facilitate the sanctioning of business for 
false or misleading information, conflict minerals disclosure was, eventually, given the status 
of ‘material’ information. While Section 1502 stated that issuers had to ‘submit’ conflict 
minerals reports, the SEC had to decide whether ‘submit’ meant ‘filing’ or merely ‘furnish-
ing’ reports. Filing made information ‘material’ to shareholder value as incorrect filings 
could make companies liable under the SEC 1934 Act for ‘false or misleading statements’ af-
fecting shareholder value. Opponents, mostly firms, advocated ‘furnishing’ – reducing com-
panies’ liability – on grounds that human rights oriented goals of Section 1502 were incon-
sistent with the disclosure of material information for investors. In letters to the SEC 
(28/2/2011; 16/2/2012), sponsors of the original bills advocated the more stringent ‘filing’ 
that received strong support from NGOs and investors. A portfolio manager explained why 
this additional disclosure was ‘of deep material interest to investors’: 
We believe that sourcing of minerals from conflict zones exposes issuers and their share-
holders to reputational, regulatory, litigation and operational risks. Therefore, a high level 
of disclosure will provide better protection for investors. (in SEC, 2011) 
 
In its final rule, the SEC increased the scope of liability to ‘file’. Section 1502 files would 
thus have the same liability implications as ‘material’ financial disclosures. 
Corporate Political Engagement 
 Frame shift 3: Companies shift from reactive to active engagement. By 2012, a sizeable 
number of companies began to change their strategy from going the ‘path of least resistance’ 
(I2) and pursuing a risk-avoidance strategy to actively engaging with the problem of sourcing 
conflict minerals. This was a critical shift because, initially, a few companies had decided to 
simply pull out of the country to avoid the ‘administrative burden and cost’ of sourcing min-
erals from DRC. Critics argued that this ‘unintended consequence’ constituted a ‘de facto 
boycott’ (I2) and ‘pushed more artisanal mining into the hands of warlords’ (I8). However, in-
stead of avoiding Congolese minerals, an increasing number of companies became active par-
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ticipants in reforming the minerals trade. A supply chain manager from a leading US-based 
electronics company noted that ‘it’s important for us to do everything within our power to try 
to break the link between minerals and armed groups.’ (I13). Companies still did not see 
themselves as the cause of the Congolese crisis, but accepted that they could play a positive 
role in preventing it: ‘It is a situation of failed governance, but we, as companies can send an 
economic signal…rewarding responsible companies and practices’ (I13). Similarly, a Philips 
position paper (2014) stated that, ‘we could use our leverage over the supply chain to help 
address the conflict and get engaged’. This was a significant leap in the position of prominent 
industry players; from initially denying or even ridiculing the link with the crisis to accepting 
that “the link between modern manufacturing and human suffering is so direct’, a spokesper-
son for Motorola Solution for Hope (2012) noted. An NGO respondent confirmed that ‘the 
discourse definitely has shifted’ (NGO5). But how did this shift emerge? 
Stimulating multi-stakeholder dialogue on conflict minerals. SEC’s two year stakeholder 
consultation process played a key role in translating Section 1502 into a final reporting rule. 
Companies, industry associations, and civil society actors were invited to submit comment 
letters and voice their concerns in private and public meetings. SEC’s comments microsite 
provided a discursive forum for affected stakeholders to publicly debate the issue. A partici-
pant (NGO5) summed up key debates. ‘Should mining companies report? Should gold be 
treated differently? Should retailers have to report?’ (see also SEC, 2012). Despite stark dif-
ferences between ‘human rights activists really wanting a very high bar’ and ‘industry associ-
ations who wanted a really low bar’ (NGO5), campaigners described the final outcome as a 
fair reflection of different stakeholder positions on the ruling: 
We were 50% pleased with everything that came out, which, maybe, is fair. You know, we 
were the extreme underdog battling against corporate interests, and maybe getting 50% of 
what we wanted and hoped for was a huge victory. (NGO4) 
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As participants of a public dialogue, companies could not deny the moral imperative of pro-
tecting human rights. In their comment letters to the SEC (2011), AMD lauded ‘the intent be-
hind this legislation’, and AngloGold Ashanti and Boeing ‘endorsed congressional action’. 
The opportunity to shape the regulation also motivated companies to engage with the issue 
and partner with NGOs. Getting high-level corporate invitations ‘started to happen fairly fre-
quently’ (NGO9). Networks emerged, such as the ‘Multi-Stakeholder Group’ involving com-
panies, NGOs and socially responsible investors ‘to arrive at a series of consensus principles 
to guide the development of the regulation’ (NGO5). Even when some industry lobby groups 
challenged the conflict minerals rule in 2013, the group’s members, including Dell, GE, HP, 
Intel, Microsoft, Motorola and Philips pledged ‘to work together to eliminate the link be-
tween violence and human rights abuses and the mineral trade in the DRC…regardless of the 
lawsuit.’ Such joint positions were hailed as the emergence of a ‘common voice’ and could 
be ‘marketed’ to policy makers as multi-party agreements. 
 By becoming participants in the regulatory initiatives, many companies began to position 
themselves as industry leaders. In their SEC comment letters, companies declared their inten-
tions to not only ‘fully comply’ with the rules, but also create an infrastructure for conflict-
free sourcing, such as the Conflict-Free Tin Initiative or Motorola’s Solutions for Hope (see 
Table 2). ‘Part of it is not just funding projects but also facilitating on the policy side, having 
discussions with the various in-region actors and facilitating alignment’, as a supply chain 
manager reported (I15). Moreover, some managers became ‘allies within companies’ who 
made ‘impassionate pleas’ to ‘drive internal change’ in company policy (NGO4). An elec-
tronics company executive (I13) noted: ‘You need everyone at the table…We all came togeth-
er to try to support programs in the area’. Through participating in multi-stakeholder public 
dialogue, industry leaders began to embrace the premise of business’s responsibility for a 
wicked problem and progressed towards becoming political actors. 
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A MODEL OF CORPORATE POLITICAL RESPONSIBILIZATION 
Looking across these observations, we explain how a ‘field frame’ of private responsibility 
for a wicked problem can emerge through five interrelated frame shifts. Figure 1 presents our 
theoretical model of the process of corporate responsibilization for a wicked problem. 
---------------------Insert figure 1 about here--------------------- 
1. Construction of a responsibility frame 
Core framing tasks – diagnosis, prognosis, and mobilization – are complicated by the scale 
and complexity of wicked problems. Constructing a plausible responsibility frame for busi-
ness involves three frame shifts; 1a, 1b and 1c, which allow a plausible diagnosis of the prob-
lem, offer a viable private sector solution and mobilize a broader audience by making the is-
sue emotionally resonant. We identified three mechanisms driving these frame shifts. 
Mechanism 1a: Cognitive shortcuts. A cognitive shortcut is created by taming or break-
ing down a multi-faceted wicked problem into sub-problems from which a single or a few 
‘points of leverage’ with plausible links to the target are handpicked. This makes the problem 
appear surmountable and allows a diagnosis. As humans tend to be ‘cognitive misers’ creat-
ing a cognitive shortcut can create the impression of having more control over addressing an 
issue (Fiske and Taylor, 1991; Simon, 1957). Reducing a problem’s scope can make it ‘per-
ceptually bounded’ (Goffman, 1974, p. 274), appear amenable to intervention (Stone, 1989) 
and provide hopeful anticipation of a solution. As the enormity and multi-scalar nature of 
wicked problems are difficult to fathom in all their complexity, confronting them in their to-
tality may breed a ‘sense of fatalism’ (Snow and Benford, 1988, p, 203). In our case, trade in 
conflict minerals, and sexual violence were focalized over other issues, such as corruption, 
that provided a point of leverage for targeting companies. Narrowing the scope of a wicked 
problem may not necessarily bode well for solving the problem, and may even lead to ad-
verse effects. For example, focalizing child labor may mask other poverty related issues 
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(Khan, Munir and Willmott, 2007). However, narrowing a wicked problem’s scope can re-
duce fatalism, make the problem appear tractable, and spur action by providing hope for a 
possible resolution. 
Mechanism 1b: Causal linkage. As a plausible prognosis needs a credible target, a wick-
ed problem needs to be causally linked to actors potentially able to provide a solution. As 
wicked problems tend to have global scope, multinational companies are attractive targets 
because their sphere of influence transcends sovereign jurisdictions. However, as a wicked 
problem may have multiple villains, the idea of singling out companies may seem far-fetched 
under a standard ‘liability CSR model’ (Young, 2006), where responsibility is assigned to an 
obvious wrongdoer, such as BP and the Gulf of Mexico oil spill. In contrast, the ‘social con-
nection model’ (Young, 2006) posits that remedying global injustices is potentially every-
one’s responsibility ‘by virtue of the social processes that connect people’ (Young, 2006, p. 
102; Schrempf, 2014). Activists can use this ‘commons logic’ – collective complicity in a 
wicked problem (Ansari et al., 2013) – to construct causality and link private actors to a prob-
lem, even if they are not the main culprit (cf., Lange and Washburn, 2012). Symbols, stories 
and metaphors are all weapons in the ‘armamentarium’ for creating creative causal links 
(Stone, 1989, p. 156; Polletta et al., 2011). Thus, even if not evident a priori, the link between 
a problem and target can be crafted through building new causal linkages.  
Mechanism 1c: Emotional connectivity. This mechanism can enable the mobilization of 
wider support for the issue by making it emotionally moving and immediate in the course of 
people’s daily lives. Wicked problems such as climate change are often ‘back-of-the-mind’ 
issues with which people do not identify in their everyday experiences (Giddens, 2009). To 
make them salient ‘front-of-the-mind’ issues, activists seek to turn them into a ‘hot cause’ 
that arouses empathy, guilt and righteous anger (Rao, 2008) and ‘puts fire in the belly and 
iron in the soul’ (Gamson, 1992, p. 32). At times, orchestrating and strategically deploying 
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‘moral shock’ can be more effective than logical arguments to spur support for a cause (Jas-
per, 2011; Scheff, 1997). For example, the emotionally imbued image of a polar bear as the 
iconic symbol of a melting Arctic can arouse support for combating climate change alongside 
scientific evidence. In our case, NGO activists focalized sexual violence that is known to 
stoke visceral discomfort over other more morally ambiguous issues such as child soldiers 
who could be both victims and perpetrators of violence. To connect it with consumers, activ-
ists linked sexual violence with mobile phones that many consumers view as part of their ‘ex-
tended selves’ (Belk, 1988). ‘Experiential commensurability’ through ‘framings congruent or 
resonant with the personal, everyday experiences of the targets of mobilization’ (Benford and 
Snow, 2000, p. 621) makes a link resound with mobilization targets. Creating emotional con-
nectivity mobilizes support by making a link appear more immediate, salient and potent. 
2. Solidification of the Responsibility Frame 
As companies may resist attempts at being made complicit in a wicked problem, this shift is 
about obliging companies to accept the responsibility frame. We identified inducing social 
judgements through public exposure and self-disclosure as key underlying mechanisms. What 
Schneiberg and Bartley (2008) call ‘regulation by information’, public exposure and self-
disclosure shift enforcement and sanctioning tasks onto consumers, investors and activists. 
Grounded in a ‘logic of consequences’ and cost-benefit calculations (March and Olsen, 
1998), these mechanisms can solidify a frame by making it financially consequential. 
Mechanisms 2a: Inducing social judgements through third-party exposure. The respon-
sibility frame can be solidified through inducing approbatory or disapprobatory social judge-
ments (Bitektine, 2011; Tost, 2011) on the social performance of target companies through 
third-party exposure. These judgements can affect a firm’s financial wellbeing as shaming 
can potentially alter its legitimacy, reputation, and risk profile (Vasi and King, 2008). Both 
shame and praise are powerful emotions for influencing behaviours (Bartley and Child, 2014; 
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Creed et al., 2014). Being put under the spotlight can induce transgressors into conforming to 
societal expectations to ‘look good’ on the ‘front stage’ and present an ‘idealized’ version of 
socially sanctioned behaviours (Goffman, 1959). Positive public appraisal may also motivate 
behaviour through generating competitive dynamics for differentiation. In our case, NGOs 
company rankings – green, yellow and red – both ‘named and shamed’ laggards and lauded 
leaders to motivate progress on the issue. While social judgements may involve episodic 
events of shaming such as after a crisis, the awareness of being potentially under the gaze, 
deemed shameful or praiseworthy, can have ‘disciplinary power’ on behaviours (Creed et al., 
2014). Both the fear of public shame and the desirability of public praise may pressure com-
panies into reforming behaviours and reinforce the responsibility frame. 
Mechanism 2b: Inducing social judgements through self-disclosure. This mechanism 
can strengthen the responsibility frame by inducing social judgements about companies 
through corporate self-disclosure. Rather than depending only on external parties to expose 
and compare differential performance, the ‘burden of proof’ is shifted onto companies by 
making them responsible for ‘knowing and showing’ their social performance. Like external 
exposure, self-reporting brings performance to the ‘front stage’ (Goffman, 1959) and can 
yield socially desirable behaviours that companies would like to publicly reveal. But rather 
than making companies respond only to episodic exposures made by external evaluators, pe-
riodic self-reporting on social performance is may require companies to integrate human 
rights concerns routinely and more systematically into their operational procedures.  
The degree to which self-reporting affects corporate behaviour is likely to depend on the 
status of the information (material or non-material) and potential liability implications (vol-
untary or mandatory). Recently there have been efforts to ‘elevate’ non-financial disclosures 
to the status of ‘material’ information to investors, such as ‘integrated reporting’ on environ-
mental, social and corporate governance (ESG) (Eccles and Serafeim, 2013). If information is 
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deemed material, financial regulators are more likely to make disclosures mandatory. In our 
case, the argument that conflict minerals use by companies was ‘material’ information per-
suaded the SEC to mandate the more stringent ‘filing’ rather than ‘furnishing’ the disclosure 
report. 
While our case showed involved state mandated disclosures, voluntary initiatives can also 
create disclosure norms, such as Ruggie’s human rights due diligence framework (Ruggie, 
2014), carbon disclosures and sustainability reports. While these disclosures may be skewed 
towards better performing companies (those without a positive story may not disclose) and 
less enforceable than mandatory disclosures, they can nevertheless lead to social sanctions for 
non-disclosure. Thus inducing social judgements can render the responsibility frame conse-
quential and thereby solidify it.  
3. Corporate adoption of the responsibility frame: Assuming a political role 
The third frame shift involves companies going beyond simply complying towards actively 
engaging with the wicked problem and co-authoring the responsibility frame.  
Mechanism 3: Deliberative integration. As against the consequentialist logic, engaging 
companies in a deliberative process of public will formation is based on the ‘logic of 
appropriateness’ – rooted in identity and norms (March and Olsen, 1998) – that can enhance 
and sustain companies’ commitment to a problem. Practices of justification during 
deliberative interactions can enable actors to transcend their narrow ‘provinciality’ 
(Habermas, 2003; Scherer and Palazzo, 2007) through the ‘civilizing effects’ of public 
deliberation (Elster, 1998). In our case, the SEC’s consultation process provided a ‘discursive 
space’ – ‘a forum for a range of different actors affected by and interested in the subject of 
the inquiry’ – to deliberate on issues of consequence (Hardy and Maguire, 2010, p. 1384). By 
participating in this dialogue, some companies revised their position from hostile resistance, 
or passive acquiescence to active engagement with the wicked problem. In a public forum, 
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participants are known to engage in ‘moral reasoning’ (Scherer et al., 2013) to make their 
arguments seem legitimate and morally valid. In our case, the public consultation process led 
corporations to publicly acknowledge responsibility for the crisis, even if privately they 
might have held different views. It was difficult for companies to publicly dispute the morally 
unambiguous principle of mitigating human suffering in a region devastated by death and 
destruction. Public deliberation may thus lead to ‘argumentative self-entrapment’ (Risse, 
1999), where companies become bound by their public commitments. Even if only rhetorical 
at first, ‘talking the talk’ can compel companies into addressing inconsistencies between what 
they say and do (Haack, Schoeneborn and Wickert, 2012). While companies may initially 
participate for strategic reasons to influence emerging norms, taking ownership can increase 
their commitment. Through deliberative integration, business can assume a political role by 
becoming co-authors of the responsibility frame. 
While these interrelated frame shifts can occur concurrently or in succession, their 
enactment, over time, can enable the emergence of a ‘field frame’ to make companies 
responsible for a wicked problem. While ‘malleable’ (Lounsbury et al., 2003) and subject to 
erosion, ongoing effort to sustain the field frame can make it more durable. Corporate 
responsibilization is an ongoing process where multiple stakeholders negotiate the boundaries 
between private and public responsibilities.  
DISCUSSION 
Societies face daunting wicked problems; poverty, obesity, corruption, civil unrest, climate 
change, bio-diversity loss, and water insecurity that involve collective action dilemmas in the 
absence of a clear, single culprit. To understand the process through which companies may 
assume responsibility for wicked problems, we document how a ‘field frame’ of corporate re-
sponsibility emerged. While bringing companies into the fray of social ills has long attracted 
scholarly attention (e.g., Carroll, 1999), it is less clear why some problems have entered the 
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private domain (e.g., human rights), while others have not (e.g., tax enforcement). We ex-
plain the social construction of private responsibility; how linking systemic problems to par-
ticular actors is neither natural nor inevitable but an ongoing social accomplishment. Social 
problems and those responsible do not exist in any objective sense but rather are ‘named’ as a 
result of collective practices (Blumer, 1971). Consequently, categorical distinctions (such as 
public/private, collective/individual and human/non-human responsibility) are historically 
and socially negotiated.  
Contributions    
We make three contributions to literatures on political CSR and social movements. First, we 
present a process model explaining how private actors can be made responsible for wicked 
problems. We explain how this requires several frame shifts that can change interpretations of 
responsibility and lead to the emergence of a new ‘field frame’ of responsibility (Lounsbury 
et al., 2003). While social movement scholarship has focused on ‘contentious performance’ 
and ‘extra-institutional’ tactics against target companies (King, 2008; Tilly, 2008) to induce 
them into adopting socially responsible behaviours, we highlight its interplay with non-
confrontational means such as deliberative dialogue (Scherer and Palazzo, 2007). Our model 
thus bridges insights from contentious performance and deliberative democracy to explain 
how both the logics of consequences and appropriateness (March and Olsen, 1998) may be at 
play in responsibilizing companies.  
Second, while political CSR scholars have explained the shift of state regulatory functions 
to private entities (Scherer and Palazzo, 2011), less attention has been paid to the changing 
role of the state and the shifting boundaries between public and private responsibilities (Davis 
et al., 2008). A globalized environment has often been linked to a loss of state power in 
transnational governance (Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson, 2006), where the state has shifted 
from being interventionist – a coercive actor regulating from above (e.g., embargoes) to de-
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volutionary – creating markets (e.g., carbon trading) or outsourcing governance (e.g., private 
standards organizations). Our findings suggest a meta-regulatory catalytic role for the state in 
enabling hybrid governance (Osborne, 1993). This involves pooling complementary capabili-
ties of business, state and civil society actors, and leveraging webs of entwinement in a glob-
alized environment to shift the burden of a wicked problem onto companies within and even 
beyond sovereign state control.  
Third, we extend social movement theory by explaining how the process of responsibiliza-
tion involves a complex interplay between framing processes – diagnosis, prognosis and mo-
bilization. Prior studies on social movements have focused on instances where the relation-
ship between the problem and culprit is relatively clear (Bakker et al., 2013; den Hond and de 
Bakker, 2007); activists identify a social problem, target offenders, leverage master frames, 
such as the injustice frame to mobilize wider support and induce them to concede to a more 
socially responsible agenda. We explain how the core framing tasks are recursive; a problem 
and its root cause can be strategically moulded in a way that allows prospectively forging a 
new causal linkage between a problem and a potential target for its solution, where, a priori, 
there is no clear link between the two, and how wider support can be mobilized for this emer-
gent frame. 
While earlier studies highlighted the ‘affective dimension of collective behavior’ (Snow 
and Oliver, 1995, p. 589), more attention is devoted to incentives and rational calculations 
(Gould, 2013) and how frames logically persuade audiences rather than emotionally galva-
nise them (Benford, 1997). We showed the role of the emotional valence of causal narratives 
and how ‘feeling and thinking are parallel, interacting processes’ (Jasper, 2011, p. 286). Both 
positive emotions, such as those linked with the desire for social approval and improving 
lives, and negative emotions, such as those stoked by shame and human suffering can ener-
gize action by acting as ‘moral batteries’ (Jasper, 2011).  
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Implications for research on political CSR and social movements  
Insights from the corporate responsibilization model. Cases are opportunities for refining 
our previous understandings of a phenomenon, and by so doing provide ‘heuristic generaliza-
tions’ (Tsoukas, 2009) and conceptual insights (Siggelkow, 2007). Mechanisms are useful 
‘toolkits’ for seeing beyond the surface-level description of a particular phenomenon and for 
theorizing new connections in the phenomenon of interest (Weber, 2006). We concatenated 
mechanisms into a general model about the process of corporate responsibilization, which 
may hold in a number of settings. While we used an extreme case of a humanitarian crisis and 
state failure in DRC, the problem of human rights abuse and state fragility is not only wicked 
but also widespread. The Failed States Index (FFP, 2013) lists 126 of 178 states as either crit-
ical, in danger, or borderline cases of state failure. Given that much global production has 
shifted to these extreme contexts, regulatory voids are an issue that confronts numerous or-
ganizations. There is growing recognition that businesses have a responsibility to ‘make sure 
that they are not complicit in human rights abuses’, as demanded by the United Nations 
Global Compact (Rasche, 2009). UN’s Ruggie framework (2011, p. 14) outlines that busi-
nesses should ‘seek to prevent or mitigate adverse human rights impacts that are directly 
linked to their operations, products or services by their business relationships, even if they 
have not contributed to those impacts.’ Yet critically, what directly linked, contributing to, or 
being complicit in means is not objectively given but contingent on collective interpretations. 
Our model elucidates the framing processes through which such causal linkages between 
business and human rights abuse are created, and then solidified and integrated. While some 
have questioned the relationship between minerals and conflict in DRC and pointed to the un-
intended consequences of this frame (Open Letter, 2014), it has nevertheless gained wide-
spread recognition. Regardless of whether this new link to address a wicked problem has 
worked or not, our theorization highlights how causality can be purposefully constructed.  
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First, the causal linkage between wicked problems and particular targets is not given but 
the result of collective framing processes. While many businesses initially found the idea of 
bearing responsibility for workers’ conditions in faraway suppliers’ factories absurd, the now 
accepted ‘sweat shop’ frame was collectively constructed through years of high profile pro-
tests and stoking of moral outrage to link emotive images of workers toiling in sweatshops to 
produce branded goods enjoyed by affluent consumers (Young, 2006). Consider the alleged 
modern-day slavery in building infrastructure for the 2022 Football World Cup in Qatar. 
While the abuse of foreign workers can be attributed to many root causes – home country 
poverty and inadequate local legislation – the problem would need to be framed in a way that 
makes it amenable to private sector intervention, such as by linking it to Western sponsors of 
the games.  
Second, our model can explain how the interplay between contentious politics and deliber-
ative engagement can lead companies into assuming a political role. Social movement schol-
ars emphasize contentious tactics like boycotts to challenge their target’s reputation (e.g., 
King, 2008) while political CSR scholars emphasize deliberative engagement (e.g., Scherer 
and Palazzo, 2007). Both approaches seek ‘frame shifting’ (Werner and Cornelissen, 2014) 
and ‘frame transformation’ (Benford and Snow, 2000) to reform corporate behaviours even if 
the means differ. Firms may not readily attend to a social problem unless pressured by activ-
ists (den Hond and de Bakker, 2007). Conversely, confrontational tactics may make firms de-
fensive and evoke mistrust, denial or symbolic response (Bartley and Child, 2014). For ex-
ample, IKEA initially reacted defensively to the negative publicity surrounding the use of 
child labour in the factories of its South Asian carpet suppliers. However, when it emerged 
that simply eliminating child labour could adversely affect children’s welfare, the Swedish 
retailer began to assume a more political role in addressing the wicked problem (Bartlett, 
Dessain and Sjoman, 2006). The logic of appropriateness and the logic of consequences are 
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thus not dichotomous variables but intertwined (Goldmann, 2005) in constructing and sus-
taining the responsibility frame. It is worth studying the dynamic interplay among different 
approaches to understand responsibilization in global environments.  
Bringing the state back in. By emphasizing the role of private actors, political CSR schol-
ars have paid less attention to the role of the state in private regulation. We find that the state 
can play a catalytic role by creating enabling conditions for private governance. By catalytic 
we mean that the state does not dictate nor enforce behaviour, but can enable, entice and le-
gitimize private governance. Entrepreneurial governments ‘steer more than they row’ and can 
act as ‘catalysts leveraging private-sector actions to solve problems’ (Osborne 1993, p. 2). As 
a catalytic actor, the state is less involved in ‘first-order’ governing to solve problems direct-
ly. Instead, its meta-governing can catalyse private governance (Kooiman, 2000, p. 154). 
We suggest that political CSR is not simply about a shift from ‘government’ to ‘govern-
ance’ or from ‘hard regulation’ to ‘soft regulation’ (e.g. Locke, 2013). Instead, it pertains to a 
holistic process of ‘experimentalist governance’ (Sabel and Zeitlin, 2012) involving both 
public and private actors with a shifting rather than a shrinking role of the government. Our 
case revealed how public and civil society actors played complementary roles in novel forms 
of governance – tripartite ‘responsive regulation’ (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992) and polycen-
tric regimes (e.g., Bartley, 2007; Selsky and Parker, 2005) – in the emerging regulation mix. 
In a hybrid arrangement, the state did not ban the import of conflict minerals but instead 
mandated self-reporting that empowered civil society actors to hold corporations accountable. 
This illustrates a complementary ‘division of labor’ between private and public roles (Rasche 
et al., 2013). The state has regulatory power but also relies on non-state actors; businesses 
have economic power and transnational reach to effect change while civil society have moral 
authority to evaluate business behaviour. Indeed, private regulation is often ‘intertwined with 
legal standards of responsibility’ (Bartley, 2005, p. 233). However, for transnational issues, 
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the state lacks authoritative control beyond its borders and needs alternative strategies such as 
‘orchestration’ (e.g., the Global Reporting Initiative as de facto international standard) to en-
rol intermediaries into sanctioning defecting firms (Abbott and Snidal, 2013). How these hy-
brid governance forms emerge and stabilize and the evolving role of the state in these ar-
rangements deserves more attention.  
For social movements scholars, the evolving relationship between private and public ac-
tors raises questions about the categorical distinctions between anti-corporate and anti-state 
social movements (e.g., King, 2008). In many cases of anti-corporate activism, the state is 
‘involved in some capacity, whether as an additional target, an earlier target, or as intermedi-
ary target used to exert leverage over corporations’ (Soule, 2012, p. 265). Our findings about 
how activists and the state conjointly devolved responsibility to companies suggest further 
investigation of the blurring boundaries between anti-state and anti-corporate activism. 
Limitations, boundary conditions and future research avenues 
While we offer one plausible account of responsibilization, it is worth considering alterna-
tive explanations. The legislation – mandatory disclosures – alone may have induced compa-
nies into taking responsibility for the wicked problem. While we cannot rule this out, this is 
less likely for three reasons. First, the state may not have legislated without the conflict min-
eral narrative that had emerged. Second, disclosures would be less consequential without vig-
ilant external parties scrutinizing them. Third, to avoid the consequences of negative social 
judgments, companies could react defensively and simply stop sourcing conflict minerals – 
often a fraction of their supply needs – from DRC. Instead, many companies participated in 
business-led initiatives for problem mitigation. While companies may initially engage in de-
liberation for strategic reasons, our data suggest that companies may become ‘morally en-
trapped’ during public deliberations and want to be (at least) seen to be addressing the prob-
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lem. In transnational arenas, where the state’s remit is limited, responsibilizing companies 
may require the interplay among different mechanisms involving multiple actors.  
Our case preserves certain particularities, which were necessary for heuristic generaliza-
tion, yet render theorization ‘open-ended’ to generate further refinements from other cases 
(Tsoukas, 2009, p. 295). First, the process of responsibilization may vary across geographic 
contexts that may have different degrees of receptivity to the construction of a responsibility 
frame. For example, consumers may have varying levels of concern about responsible sourc-
ing. This suggests that responsibilization is shaped by broader normative and regulatory envi-
ronments and varying stakeholder expectations about corporate responsibility (Lange and 
Washburn, 212). Second, sectors have different ‘industry structures’ and companies have dif-
ferent ‘corporate cultures’ that render them more or less vulnerable to social movement or 
regulatory actions (Schurman, 2004). Big household names such as Nike tend to be more 
concerned about their reputation and more vulnerable than smaller firms, or those producing 
generic products. Third, the emergence of a field frame of responsibility may be contingent 
on ‘political opportunity structures’ (Gamson and Meyer, 1996) that shape activists’ deci-
sions about initiating change. However, political opportunity structures are themselves ‘so-
cially constructed’ (Campbell, 2005, p. 49). In our case, legislators had gone through several 
failed Congress bills on the issue before they could leverage the Dodd Frank Act opportunity 
to ‘slide in’ the conflict mineral rule. Future studies can examine how activists construct po-
litical opportunities over a longer time horizon and the role that other social movements may 
play in these efforts. Also, while external ‘jolts’, such as social upheavals or environmental 
disasters (Meyer, Brooks and Goes, 1990) provide contextual openings for responsibilizing 
companies, they are not entirely ‘external’ to change efforts, but ‘rather figure in an already 
developing narrative’ (Munir, 2005, p. 94). For instance, the 2013 Rana Plaza factory catas-
trophe in Bangladesh triggered moral outrage and led to over 180 companies signing a legally 
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binding ‘Accord’ for greater business responsibility in factory safety. However, the Accord 
was preceded by years of NGO and unions’ efforts to engage businesses following a series of 
industrial accidents. When Rana Plaza collapsed, ‘prepared’ actors leveraged the event for 
pressuring companies into accepting more responsibility. The study of how some events yield 
responsibilization while others do not is another promising research avenue.  
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Table 1: Timeline of selected events 
Date Actor Event description 
1994 RW. Rwanda Genocide 
1999 UN  U.N. peacekeeping operation (MONUC) 
2001 UN  U.N.S.C. Resolution: Condemns illegal exploitation of DRC minerals 
2002 UN  U.N. report on natural resource exploitation (Focus on forced labour) 
2002 NGO ‘The war within the war: sexual violence against women and girls in 
eastern Congo’ (Human Rights Watch report) 
2003 UN / 
USA 
Launch of Kimberley Process to curb trade in conflict diamonds / US 
Clean Diamond Trade Act (CDTA) 
2003 UN  U.N.S.C. Resolution 1493: Arms embargo on armed groups in DRC 
2005 UN  U.N.S.C. Resolution 1596: Sanctions against  embargo violations  
05/2008 USA 1st Senate Bill: Conflict Coltan and Cassiterite Act of 2008 (CCCA)  
2008 UN  U.N.S.C. Resolution: Calls for due diligence on minerals origin  
03/2009 Firm Tin Supply Chain Initiative (iTSCi) 
04/2009 NGO Enough Project launches ‘Conflict Minerals Initiative’  
2009 NGO ‘Conflict-Free Campus’ Students Taking Action Now (USA) 
04/2009 USA 2nd Senate Bill: Congo Conflict Minerals Act of 2009 (CCMA)  
07/2009 NGO ‘War and the Militarization of Mining in the Congo’ (Global Witness) 
11/2009 USA House Bill: The Conflict Minerals Trade Act of 2009 
12/2009 MSI  Launch of Multi-Stakeholder Group (Responsible Sourcing Network) 
07/2010 USA Dodd-Frank Act (Section 1502 on conflict minerals) becomes law 
12/2011 OECD OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of 
Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas 
2010 Firm Conflict-Free Smelter Program (Global e-Sustainability Initiative (Ge-
SI)/Electronics Industry Citizenship Coalition (EICC)) 
06/2011 UN  U.N. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights  
2010/11 DRC Ban on all mining in the Eastern DRC 
06/2011 Firm Solutions for Hope (Motorola/AVX) for conflict-free tantalum 
10/2011 PPA Public-Private Alliance for Responsible Minerals Trade (PPA) 
10/2011 USA California Public Procurement Law (SB 861) on conflict minerals 
03/2012 Firm Responsible Jewellery Council Chain-of-Custody Standard 
05/2012 Firm London Bullion Market Association Responsible Gold Forum  
05/2012 Firm World Gold Council Conflict-free standard 
08/2012 USA SEC Final Rule on conflict minerals 
09/2012 Firm iPoint Conflict Minerals Platform (Automotive Industry Action Group) 
10/2012 PPA Conflict-Free Tin Initiative  
03/2014 EU European Union draft legislation on conflict minerals  
05/2014 SEC 1st SEC Disclosure of Conflict Minerals Reports due 
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Table 2: Overview of frame shifts, core mechanisms and illustrative data 
Frame 
shift 
Previous Frame New frame Mechanisms and illustrative quotes 
1a: 2008-
2010 
 
NGOs, 
US State 
Intractable and ‘lost 
cause’ 
Lack of convincing nar-
rative ‘in terms of in-
spiring action and mak-
ing people feel like they 
can do something about 
it.’ (NGO1). 
Amenable to intervention  
‘We ought to do all we can to 
make sure that the products 
we use and the minerals we 
import, in no way support 
those who violate human 
rights abroad.’ (Sen. Durbin, 
press release, 23.05.2008) 
Cognitive shortcuts – Reducing com-
plexity and narrowing scope to single 
‘root cause’ 
‘1,500 people a day dying because of 
this; $400 a pound for Coltan, financing 
this death and destruction daily.’ (US 
Sen. Brownback, Cong Rec S1047, fo-
cusing on single issue as ‘roots cause’) 
1b: 2008-
2010 
 
NGOs / 
US state 
Wicked problem as 
public responsibility 
‘First, the U.S. must fo-
cus its policy priorities 
on the humanitarian 
and national security 
implications…the U.S. 
and its allies must help 
the newly elected Con-
go government.’ 
(Enough, 2007) 
Wicked problem as private re-
sponsibility 
‘Suddenly, the war is not a 
problem of inadequate gov-
ernance, but one of trade-
driven violence to be solved by 
multi-national electronics 
manufacturers.’ (I15) 
Causal linkage between target and ‘root 
cause’ 
‘Without knowing it, tens of millions of 
people in the United States may be put-
ting money in the pockets of some of the 
worst human rights violators in the 
world, simply by using a cell phone or 
laptop computer.’ (Sen Durbin, 23 May 
2008) 
1c: 2008-
2010 
 
NGOs 
Remote back-of-the-
mind issue 
‘Do consumers care? 
Does a consumer go in-
to a shop and ask 
what’s the source of 
your material?…My 
guess is most consum-
ers don’t care.’ (I9) 
‘Connected’ front-of-the-mind 
issue 
‘Your mobile phone [is] 
screaming in your ear 
that….you are complicit in 
murder, torture and rape of 
millions in the remote eastern 
edge of…Congo.’ (News item, 
2009) 
Emotional connectivity between audi-
ence (consumers) and issue (sexual vio-
lence) 
‘You make that connection about lap-
tops and MP3s and cell phones and 
stuff…you’re connecting youth with 
something that speaks to youth.’ 
(NGO9)  
2: 2010 
 
NGOs / 
US state 
Companies deny re-
sponsibility 
‘It’s really a security 
problem and a 
longstanding ethnic 
conflict…then we got 
involved in lobbying 
against what became 
Dodd Frank.’ (I14) 
Companies acquiesce to re-
sponsibility 
‘Our official position…is that 
we’re deeply distressed by 
what’s going on in the 
DRC...But we do not believe 
that … any supply chain ini-
tiative is the appropriate way 
to address that… Obviously 
once there is a law they’re go-
ing to comply.’ (I14) 
i. Inducing social judgments through 
exposure  
Naming and shaming has a powerful 
role to play in changing corporate be-
haviour. It shouldn’t be relegated as a 
sort of shameful tactic.’ (NGO3). 
ii. Inducing social judgments through 
self-disclosure 
‘If Apple is sourcing from a mine filled 
with human rights abuses, then Apple’s 
reputation suffers. That could lead to a 
decrease in the stock price.’ (NGO3) 
3: >2010 
NGOs/ 
US state, 
SEC / In-
dustry  
Companies acquiesce to 
responsibility 
(see above)  
Corporations assume political 
role 
‘This is the moment for manu-
facturers every-where to be 
powerful actors for good, to 
fundamentally change the way 
minerals are bought.’ 
(Motorola Solution for Hope, 
2012)  
Deliberative integration of companies 
‘Through that multi-stakeholder work-
ing group a lot of the advocacy groups 
and companies actually came to know 
each other […] through that process 
some of them have now moved for-
ward.’ (NGO7) 
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Figure 1: A model of corporate responsibilization for wicked problems 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
i
 The legislation came into effect for the calendar year beginning January 1, 2013 with the first reports due May 
31, 2014. Industry associations lost court battles to avert this legislative requirement to disclose whether their 
supply chains are free of conflict minerals. They are still free to use minerals linked to conflict but need to dis-
close it. 
 
